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Within the literature of psychological and decision sciences, 
there is a critical difference in the way recognition is defined 
and studied experimentally. To address this difference, the 
current experiment examines and attempts to disentangle the 
influence of two recognition judgment sources (from within 
an experiment and from an individual’s prior life experiences) 
upon two different recognition judgments. By presenting 
participants with a set of related stimuli that vary naturally in 
environmental occurrence and by manipulating exposure 
within an experimental context, this experiment allows for a 
broader and more ecologically valid assessment of 
recognition memory. Contrasting with the typical word-
frequency effect, the results reveal an overall bias to judge 
high-frequency items as studied on an episodic recognition 
test. Additionally, the results underscore the role of context 
by showing that a single study exposure increases the 
probability that individuals will judge stimuli as presented 
outside the laboratory. 
Keywords: Recognition memory; decision-making; 
ecological validity  
Recognizing the Difference between 
Recognition and Recognition  
In general, recognition refers to the experience wherein 
upon encountering a stimulus an individual has a sense that 
she has encountered that stimulus before. A recognition 
judgement, in turn, is when an individual explicitly claims 
that a stimulus was previously encountered. Within the 
literatures of psychological and decision sciences, there is a 
critical difference in the way recognition is studied 
experimentally. While one set of research focuses on an 
individual’s capacity to recognize stimuli presented 
previously within an experimental episode (episodic 
recognition memory), the other set focuses on an 
individual’s capacity to recognize stimuli as previously 
encountered during the individual’s prior life experiences 
before beginning an experiment (pre-experimental 
recognition memory). Although these types of recognition 
are typically studied independently, the sources of 
experience related to both are inherently interconnected. 
Indeed, the experience of recognition is influenced by an 
individual’s prior life experiences as well as by the 
experiences she has during an experiment. The current work 
provides a framework for studying recognition memory in a 
way that more readily relates to these two intertwined 
factors. 
In what follows, we first broadly describe the lines of 
research related to both types of recognition judgements, 
including prior work that has examined their interconnected 
nature. Within this review, we note criticisms of each line of 
research. Following this, we (1) describe a research 
methodology that draws upon both lines of work to address 
these concerns, (2) present the results of an experiment 
adopting this approach, and (3) discuss implications of these 
results and considerations for future work.  
Episodic Recognition in Memory Research 
Recognition memory has been studied extensively with list-
learning experiments. Here, stimuli, such as words or 
pictures, are presented individually in the form of a study 
list. After a delay ranging from a few seconds to multiple 
days, participants are presented with a recognition memory 
test list, and are asked to discriminate targets (stimuli from 
the study list) from foils (new items). Episodic recognition 
memory has been the focus of decades of extensive research 
and has been noted as an increasingly prevalent research 
paradigm (e.g., Hintzman, 2011).  
A major strength of the episodic recognition memory line 
of research is experimental control. This is, in part, achieved 
by minimizing the role of individual stimuli, such as by 
presenting mixed lists of unrelated and uncommon concrete 
nouns. This approach follows in the footsteps of pioneering 
memory researcher Ebbinghaus (1885), who used nonsense 
stimuli to avoid the influence of everyday exposure.  
The advantage of striving for experimental control in this 
way is also a disadvantage when it comes to understanding 
how memory judgments operate within everyday decision-
making. For example, Neisser (1976) argued that memory 
research should strive toward ecological validity.  Drawing 
upon work in perception by Brunswik (1957) and Gibson 
(1979), ecological validity refers to applicability outside the 
laboratory. The importance of ecological validity is 
underscored by research on eyewitness testimony. For 
instance, when participants study mixed lists of unrelated 
words, a positive relationship between accuracy and 
confidence is typically found (e.g., Dallenbach, 1913; 
Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). This intuitive finding 
dovetails with the 1972 and 1976 U.S. Supreme Court 
rulings suggesting that highly confident eyewitness 
identification is likely accurate. This pattern, however, does 
not hold for lists of similar material (i.e., categorized lists, 
see e.g., DeSoto & Roediger, 2014), such as description 
details of suspects presented to an eyewitness (e.g., Smith, 
Kassin, & Ellsworth, 1989). It is disconcerting to consider 
how other memory research findings might also be 
misleading due to a similar lack of ecological validity.  
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Departing from the convention of presenting participants 
with mixed lists of uncommon, unrelated stimuli would 
inherently introduce an additional factor, which might 
interact with or overshadow other experimental 
manipulations. Specifically, a by-product of presenting 
participants with a more ecologically valid set of related 
stimuli is that the individual items will vary based on how 
often each occurs outside the laboratory. The influence of 
environmental frequency upon episodic recognition 
judgements has been the focus of extensive research (e.g., 
Dennis & Humphreys, 2001; Estes, 1994; Glanzer & 
Adams, 1985; Lohnas & Kahana, 2013; McClelland & 
Chappell, 1998; Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997). In these 
experiments, study and test lists are composed of unrelated 
words that are sampled randomly from a range of low 
linguistic frequency words and high linguistic frequency 
words. The typical word-frequency finding on an episodic 
recognition memory test is that low-frequency target words 
are more accurately judged to be “old” than high-frequency 
target words and low-frequency foil words are more 
accurately judged to be “new” than high-frequency foils. 
Although this line of research does begin to reintroduce the 
influence of pre-experimental exposure into a laboratory 
setting, these experiments still tend to favor experimental 
control over ecological validity in numerous ways. First, the 
study lists in these experiments are typically composed of 
stimuli that are sampled from opposite poles along a 
continuum of environmental frequency—either extremely 
low-frequency or extremely high-frequency (but see Lohnas 
& Kahana, 2013, for an exception), essentially transforming 
the naturally continuous variable of environmental 
frequency into a dichotomized factor. Second, the study and 
test lists used in these experiments are often composed of 
unrelated words. That is, the stimuli belong to many 
disparate categories and, thus, do not related to one another 
regarding any real-world inferences, such as person details 
in relation to culpability.  
It may be the case that, similar to experiments 
investigating the word-frequency effect (e.g., Glanzer & 
Adams, 1985), a mnemonic advantage for low-frequency 
items emerges if participants are tested with a related set of 
stimuli sampled with varying degrees of environmental 
frequency. There is some evidence, however, suggesting 
that this pattern of superior recognition accuracy for low-
frequency items might not persist. Specifically, in an 
experiment by Jacoby, Woloshyn, and Kelley (1989), which 
investigated the influence of environmental frequency by 
composing study and test lists of famous and nonfamous 
names, the results of an episodic recognition test revealed 
that famous names (i.e., high-frequency items) were more 
likely to be judged as presented on the study list than 
nonfamous ones (i.e., low-frequency items), regardless of 
whether or not they were actually studied. Thus, it may turn 
out that the low-frequency item advantage, borne out of 
memory research favoring experimental control over 
ecological validity, may not hold when participants are 
tested with sets of related stimuli. 
Pre-Experimental Recognition in Decision-Making 
Research 
Numerous researchers have investigated how individuals 
use pre-experimental recognition, a sense of prior exposure 
to a stimulus outside the laboratory, during decision-making 
(e.g., Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; Erdfelder, 
Küpper-Tetzel, & Mattern, 2011; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 
2002; Hertwig, Herzog, Schooler, & Reimer, 2008; 
Marewski & Schooler, 2011).  A sense of pre-experimental 
recognition has been shown to influence a wide array of 
judgments, including about population size (e.g., Marewski 
& Schooler, 2011), fame (Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 
1989), and company revenue (Hertwig, et al., 2008), to 
name but a few. This work has shown that the frequency of 
occurrence for a given stimulus in the environment (which 
can be estimated by counting how often a stimulus, say a 
city name, occurs on the Internet or in the print media), 
allows for modeling how likely and how quickly the 
stimulus is to be recognized (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2008). 
Overall, this body of research underscores the intuitive 
notion that a sense of recognition is paramount for making 
many everyday decisions.  
The influence of pre-experimental recognition upon 
decision-making is typically studied within probabilistic 
inference experiments, in which individuals are assumed to 
use known attributes of a stimulus as cues to make 
inferences about an unknown or future criterion. These 
experiments typically include a recognition task and a 
paired-comparison inference task. In the recognition task, 
participants are shown a list of related stimuli, such as city 
names, and asked to judge if they recognize each item from 
their prior life experience. Additionally, some experiments 
ask individuals to report if they have additional knowledge 
beyond a sense of pre-experimental recognition for each 
object. Reponses from this task and their respective 
response times are later used, to predict judgments on the 
paired-comparison inference task. In the paired-comparison 
inference task, individuals are shown two items at a time 
from a related set of stimuli and asked to infer which 
alternative is higher or lower on some judgement criterion, 
such as which of two cities has a larger population size.  
In part because of its rigid simplicity, one decision 
strategy in particular, the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 2002), has been the focus of much research and 
debate. This strategy assumes that, stemming from an 
existing relationship in the world between environmental 
occurrence and a given criterion (e.g., population size), a 
sense of pre-experimental recognition can readily guide 
decisions in a straightforward way. Specifically, the 
recognition heuristic assumes that on a paired-comparison 
inference task, if one decision alternative is recognized and 
the other is not, individuals will judge the recognized 
alternative to have a higher value on the criterion.  
In general, this line of research is aptly commended for 
showcasing and exploring how memory is employed for 
everyday decisions. One major criticism of this research, 
however, is that the assumptions about recognition memory 
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fail to appropriately draw upon theory from the abundance 
of related recognition memory research (e.g., Dougherty, 
Franco-Watkins, & Thomas, 2008; Newell & Fernandez, 
2006). It appears that much of the work on recognition-
based decision-making assumes that pre-experimental 
recognition is a fixed commodity, whereas research 
concerning episodic recognition memory has revealed many 
ways in which a sense of recognition is influenced by 
contextual conditions. For example, Jacoby et al. (1989) 
found that presenting nonfamous names within an 
experiment study phase increased the likelihood that these 
nonfamous names would be incorrectly judged as famous 
later (see also Hertwig et al., 2008). Related to this, Pohl 
and colleagues (Pohl, Erdfelder, Michalkiewicz, Castela, & 
Hilbig, 2016), point out two typical experimental procedure 
choices that fail to consider how a sense of pre-experimental 
recognition might be influenced by experimental conditions. 
Both entail how participants, during an earlier part of the 
experiments, are often exposed to the stimuli that they are 
later asked to consider during a paired-comparison inference 
task. First, to obtain a large number of paired-comparison 
inference trials, items are often paired repeatedly with 
different items, such that each item appears numerous times 
during the task. Additionally, the order of the two tasks is 
often counterbalanced across participants, such that some 
participants have the recognition task first and others have 
the paired-comparison inference task first. These two typical 
methodology choices may influence the sense of pre-
experimental recognition and respective recognition speed 
that individuals might use during decision-making. 
Although Pohl and colleagues (2016) focused on 
recognition speed specifically in relation to these 
methodology concerns, context conditions such as exposure 
within an experiment might also influence the probability 
that participants will judge stimuli as recognized from 
outside the laboratory. This is one of the concerns the 
current approach addresses. 
Experiment 
The purpose of the current experiment is to investigate the 
influence of two fundamental sources of experience, one 
stemming a person’s prior life experiences before entering 
the laboratory and another stemming from the experiences 
within an experimental context, upon recognition 
judgements. Specifically, the memory source related to the 
experimental context here is a single study exposure and the 
memory source related to prior life experiences is pre-
experimental exposure (estimated with web frequencies). 
The influence of both sources is examined for both episodic 
recognition (e.g., “Was this city name presented earlier 
during the experiment?”) and pre-experimental recognition 
(e.g., “Have you ever heard of this city name before 
beginning the experiment?”). In line with ecological 
validity, instead of informing participants that stimuli 
presented during the study phase would be presented during 
a later memory test, incidental study exposure was adapted 
from Hertwig et al. (2008).  
In relation to previous work, the current experiment also 
addresses the following two questions. First, does the 
typical low-frequency item advantage for episodic 
recognition memory (e.g., Glanzer & Adams, 1985) occur 
when individuals are tested with a more ecologically valid 
set of stimuli (i.e., stimuli from a related set that vary based 
on their natural occurrence outside the laboratory)? Second, 
to what extend does a single incidental study exposure 
influence judgements of pre-experimental recognition, and, 
if so, does this influence depend on the environmental 
frequency of stimuli?  
Method 
Participants A total of 63 individuals (mean age = 21.5 
years, 56% female) recruited from the University of 
Lausanne were paid roughly 26 Swiss francs each 
(depending on performance) for participating in the 
experiment. They were tested individually.  
Design The study was conducted as a within-subjects design 
with one independent variable, study status, one pseudo-
independent variable, environmental frequency, and two 
dependent variables (measured using within-subjects 
blocks), episodic recognition judgements and pre-
experimental recognition judgements. Study status was 
manipulated within-subjects by presenting half of the to-be-
tested stimuli within a preceding study phase. Pre-
experimental frequency was estimated for each stimulus 
using Wikipedia page occurrences as a proxy for 
environmental occurrence.  
Stimuli The stimuli presented during the experiment were 
from a set of 200 city names from North American and 
Western European countries (Canada, England, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and USA). Additionally, eight extra 
city names were used at the beginning and end of the study 
task to minimize primacy and recency study effects. The 
city names used in the experiment were sampled such that 
the entire set would include cities from each country that 
varied in both population size (population statistics obtained 
from www.citypopulation.de) and environmental occurrence 
(as approximated by Wikipedia page occurrences) and 
excluded capital cities. All stimuli were counterbalanced 
such that each occurred roughly equally often in all study 
and test conditions. 
Procedure The experiment was conducted on a computer 
using E-Prime experimental software (Psychology Software 
Tools). Participants were informed that there would be three 
separate tasks and payment would depend of their 
performance in each task. First, all participants had an 
incidental study task, in which half of the city names (100) 
were presented. Specifically, participants were shown each 
city name individually and asked to count the number of 
vowels in each city name. At the beginning of each trial a 
fixation cross (+) appeared on the screen for 2 s along with a 
reminder of the task. Participants were informed that the 
fixation cross would occur immediately before each city 
name was presented to help them prepare to respond. 
Afterwards, a city name replaced the fixation cross and 
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participants were prompted to press the appropriate number 
key on the keyboard corresponding to the number of vowels 
in the city name. Participants were given up to 4 s to make 
their response and a blank screen was presented for 2 s 
between trials.  
The following test phase consisted of two separate tasks, 
an episodic recognition task (“Was this city name presented 
during the vowel counting task”) and a pre-experimental 
recognition task (“Have you ever heard of this city name 
before beginning the experiment?”). Participants were asked 
to respond with one of two keyboard keys to respond “yes” 
or “no” for each test trial. Participants were given as long as 
needed to make their response in both tasks. Each task block 
consisted of 100 trials, which included half studied and half 
unstudied city names. Importantly, city names were not 
repeated across test tasks, but were counterbalanced 
between-subjects such that each city name would occur 
roughly equally often in each test phase. The order of test 
tasks was counterbalanced between-subjects. Similar to the 
study phase, each trial began with a 2 s fixation cross and 
was followed by a 2 s intertrial interval during both 
recognition tasks.  
Results 
The data from all 63 participants was analyzed, excluding 
trials for one city name due to a clerical error. Wikipedia 
page occurrence values were log transformed to 
approximate a linear relationship across city names (e.g., 
Marewski & Schooler, 2011). Given the two binary 
dependent variables, separate logistic regressions were 
planned for both episodic recognition and pre-experimental 
recognition judgments. 
 
Episodic Recognition Results from the episodic recognition 
task are presented in Figure 1. From visual inspection of 
Figure 1, two patterns are apparent. First, the probability 
that participants judged city names as presented during the 
study phase was higher for studied city names than for 
unstudied city names. Second, the probability of judging 
city names as studied increased as a function of 
environmental frequency. Moreover, the difference in 
recognition probabilities between studied and unstudied city 
names did not seem to vary as a function of environmental 
frequency. To test the influence of both factors (study status 
and environmental frequency), a multilevel logistic 
regression analysis was conducted to fit the episodic 
recognition data. A test of the model against a constant only 
model indicated that the predictors as a set provided an 
improved fit (χ2 = 980, df = 2, p < .001, Nagelkerke’s R2 = 
.20). The Wald criterion demonstrated both factors, study 
status (z = 5.38) and environmental frequency (z = 6.82), 
contributed to the model fit (p < .001 for both). 
Additionally, by comparing the model to another which 
included an additional interaction term of the two factors, 
evidence of an interaction between study status and 
environmental frequency was not found (χ2 = .27, df = 1, p = 
.61). To control for the variance associated with the random 
factor of repeated measurements from individual 
participants, follow-up generalized linear mixed models 
were conducted. The same pattern emerged: both factors of 
study status (z = 5.22, p < .001) and environmental 
frequency (z = 6.77, p < .001) contributed to the model fit, 
and there was no evidence of an interaction between the two 
found (χ2 = .78, df = 1, p = .38). 
 
 
Figure 1: Mean episodic recognition rates. The left side depicts the 
mean influence of study exposure for all city names with standard 
error bars. The right side depicts the influence of both study 
exposure and environmental frequency for each city name with a 
moving average for both studied and unstudied city names across 
environmental frequency. 
 
Comparison to previous results The results from the 
episodic recognition task contrast with the typical word-
frequency effect (e.g., Glanzer & Adams, 1985), which 
reveal an interaction between study and environmental 
frequency, such that low-frequency targets are recognized 
more accurately (i.e., higher hit rate and lower false alarm 
rate) than high-frequency targets and low-frequency lures 
are correctly rejected more accurately than high-frequency 
lures (e.g., Lohnas & Kahana, 2013). Instead, the current 
results show that when participants are tested with a set of 
related stimuli, high-frequency items are more likely to be 
judged as studied regardless of if they were studied or 
unstudied (i.e., higher hit and false alarm rates for high-
frequency items). Why did this pattern of results differ from 
the typical word-frequency effect? Although further work is 
required to better address this question, we can provide 
some speculation. The potentially stronger association with 
the experiment context for low-frequency items, perhaps 
due to item distinctiveness, may have been relatively diluted 
in the current experiment for a number of reasons. First, one 
important difference to remark upon is the overall low 
episodic recognition accuracy from the current experiment 
compared to previous word-frequency experiments (e.g., 
Lohnas & Kahana, 2013). We suspect this difference can be 
attributed to the difficulty inherent in testing sets of related 
stimuli and stemming from incidental study (e.g., Criss & 
Shiffrin, 2004). This increased task difficulty may have led 
participants be more influenced by the pre-existing 
associations for high-frequency items, since these 
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associations are less contingent upon the study conditions 
than the associations between the context and studied items.   
 
Pre-Experimental Recognition Results from the pre-
experimental recognition task are presented in Figure 2. 
From visual inspection of Figure 2, two patterns are 
apparent. First, the probability of judging city names as 
recognized from outside the laboratory increased as a 
function of environmental frequency. Second, the 
probability that participants judged city names as 
recognized from outside the laboratory was slightly higher 
for studied city names than for unstudied city names. 
Additionally, it appears that the influence of a study 
exposure was relatively consistent across varying degrees of 
environmental frequency. To test the influence of both 
factors (study status and environmental frequency), a 
multilevel logistic regression analysis was conducted to fit 
pre-experimental recognition judgements using study status 
and environmental frequency as predictors. A test of the 
model against a constant only model indicated that both 
predictors as a set provided an improved fit (χ2 = 1739, df = 
2, p < .001, Nagelkerke’s R2 = .323). The Wald criterion 
demonstrated both factors, study status (z = 4) and 
environmental frequency (z = 32), contributed to the model 
fit (p < .001 for both). Additionally, by comparing the 
model to another which included an additional interaction 
term for the two factors, evidence of an interaction between 
study status and environmental frequency was not found (χ2 
= .621, df = 1, p = .431). Evidence for the same pattern was 
suggested by a generalized linear mixed model with the 
categorical variable of participant included as a random 
factor.  
 
Comparison to previous results Similar to previous work 
(e.g., Marewski & Schooler, 2011), the current results 
support the use of web frequencies as a reasonable predictor 
of pre-experimental recognition. The results from the pre-
experimental recognition task also converge with previous 
work showing that an experimental exposure increases the 
probability of inferring an item to be higher on a criterion 
related to pre-experimental exposure, such as the fame of 
individuals (Jacoby et al., 1989) or population size of cities 
(Hertwig et al., 2008). Unlike previous work, however, the 
current experiment examines the relationship of a single 
incidental study exposure across items varying in 
environmental frequency continuously from extremely 
infrequent to extremely frequent. Importantly, the current 
work examines pre-experimental recognition instead of 
inference judgments, which are assumed to be influenced by 
a sense of pre-experimental recognition. By focusing on this 
more basic memory judgment, the current approach and 
respective data reveal that the presentation of stimuli within 
an experimental context influences a sense of pre-
experimental recognition that is core to much research on 
memory-based decision research (e.g., Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 2002). One novel finding is that, because of the 
lack of an interaction between study and environmental 
frequency, it appears a single study exposure results in a 
relatively constant increase in the probability of pre-
experimental recognition across all items, regardless of 
environmental frequency.  
 
 
Figure 2: Mean pre-experimental recognition rates. The left side 
bar graph depicts the mean influence of study exposure for all city 
names with standard error bars. The right side depicts the influence 
of both study exposure and environmental frequency for each city 
name with a moving average for both studied and unstudied city 
names across environmental frequency. 
Discussion 
The main purpose of the current work is to showcase a 
broad approach to studying recognition memory—one that 
considers how different types of recognition emerge as a 
function of the interconnected factors of (1) an individual’s 
prior life experiences and (2) an individuals’ recent and 
current experiences within an experimental context. This 
approach was designed to better translate results from 
memory experiments into real-world situations. This was 
achieved by testing recognition judgements for related 
stimuli, which, in turn, we assume more readily relate to 
everyday recognition judgments and memory-based 
inferences. For instance, one might be asked to identify or 
corroborate which colleagues were present at a company 
meeting or holiday party. This would entail gauging 
exposure within a context for a related set of stimuli (e.g., 
co-workers) that vary based on their environmental 
frequency (i.e., some are more well-known than others). 
This kind of everyday memory task contrasts sharply with 
the typical kind of recognition memory task used in 
psychology experiments, in which stimuli are unrelated and 
environmental occurrence is either constrained or 
dichotomized into highly disparate factor levels (extremely 
low and high-frequency bins).  
The importance of adopting a broader and more 
ecologically valid approach to understanding recognition 
memory is underscored by the current experiment results. In 
contrast to the typical word frequency effect (increased 
episodic recognition accuracy for low-frequency items) 
found in many previous experiments, (e.g., Glanzer & 
Adams, 1985; Lohnas & Kahana, 2013), the current 
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experiment results showed an increased tendency to judge 
high-frequency items from a set of related stimuli as 
studied.  
The current experiment results also provide evidence 
suggesting that context conditions, such as a single 
incidental study exposure, influence pre-experimental 
recognition judgements. This finding suggests that 
researchers examining memory-based inferences should 
strongly consider how often and in what manner stimuli are 
presented within an experiment. Related to this concern, 
although separate sets of stimuli were presented during both 
recognition test phases (episodic and pre-experimental) of 
the current experiment, we reanalyzed both sets of data with 
the inclusion of test task order as a factor to help rule out the 
influence of task demands upon the results. For both 
recognition tasks, the same main effects (study exposure 
and environmental frequency) and lack of interaction were 
supported. Importantly, these results did not interact with 
task order and a main effect of task order was not found.  
There are numerous possible extensions of the current 
work. One is to incorporate the influence of context factors 
into models of memory-based decision-making. 
Additionally, the influence of list composition (e.g., 
Malmberg & Murnane, 2002) upon both episodic and pre-
experimental recognition can be explored with sets of 
related stimuli, such as city names. Although the current 
experiment included related stimuli that varied widely on 
environmental frequency and the stimulus set was somewhat 
balanced, in that half of the city names were typically 
recognized, it remains largely unexplored to what degree a 
sense of recognition is influenced by the composition of 
study and test lists of related sets of stimuli. Similar to list 
composition effects, testing other stimulus materials, such 
as eyewitness-related description details, may help reveal 
the influence of varying environmental occurrence patterns.  
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